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It is widely accepted that understanding system requirements is important for software development project success 
[1,2]. Put another way, it is widely acknowledged that failing to understand requirements is related to project failure 
[3,4]. The idea that software artifacts generally have a set of discoverable, documentable requirements is entrenched in 
industry standards [5], development processes [2] and educational curricula [6,7]. More broadly, requirements are a 
fundamental component of the Rational Model of Design [8-10], the dominant view of how practitioners approach 
developing software and information systems. However, utilizing good requirements practices may not be a necessary 
or sufficient condition for project success [11,12].
The assumption that software projects have discoverable, documentable requirements has motivated diverse literature 
on requirements engineering (RE), the process of identifying, analyzing, modeling, verifying and managing 
requirements. Major contributions include RE approaches (e.g., goal-oriented RE [13], user-centered RE [14]) and 
requirement types (e.g., non-functional requirements [15], early requirements [16]). 
However, at least three software development projects that I have observed or participated in have produced not a 
single, meaningful requirement. Although they produced statements labelled as requirements, closer inspection revealed 
that they were something else – goals, design decisions, to-do- or wish-list items. Therefore, the purpose of this 
viewpoint is to explore the possibility of software projects with few or illusory requirements. 
1 Some Explicit Assumptions
Different authors have defined “requirement” in different ways, alternatively as “a structural or behavioral property that 
a design object must possess” [17, p. 108], “a statement that identifies a capability or function that is needed by a 
system in order to satisfy its customer’s needs” [18, p. 205] and “a property which must be exhibited in order to solve 
some problem in the real world” [19, sec. 1.1]. 
Requirements are often differentiated from goals and design decisions. “A goal is an objective the system under 
consideration should achieve” [13, p. 2]. Where “goals describe the desired impacts of a design object on its 
environment” [17, p. 110], “requirements are usually understood as stating what a system is supposed to do, as opposed 
to how it should do it” [20, p. 226]. Similarly, Roman argued that “requirements specifications state the desired 
functional and performance characteristics of some component independent of any actual realization” [21, p. 14]. 
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Likewise, IEEE Standard 830-1998 states that “a requirement specifies an externally visible function or attribute of a 
system [while] a design describes a particular subcomponent of a system and/or its interfaces with other 
subcomponents” [5, p. 9]. Understanding the relationships between goals, requirements and design decisions is the 
essence of the requirements traceability problem [cf. 22,23].
These varying definitions clarify the need for more explicit ontological assumptions underlying RE. For the purposes of 
this paper, I assume that a software development project produces an artifact called the design object having properties 
called features. Project participants or stakeholders may assign to the design object one or more goals – optative 
statements describing a change in the environment that the design object is desired to produce. A requirement is a 
feature of a design object that is necessary to achieve a goal. (While this is an unconventional way of defining 
requirement, it significantly simplifies explaining the two challenges advanced below, which do not hinge on this 
particular definition.) For example, suppose a development team is designing a website (the design object) to sell 
cameras online (the goal). The website will have many features (e.g., having the store name in a bold font) that do not 
substantially contribute to achieving its goal. However, other features (e.g., shopping cart) may be necessary conditions 
for achieving the goal – these necessary features are requirements. More precisely, given a goal g, a set of requirements 
Rg, may be defined as the set of all features necessary for a design object to achieve g. For the purposes of this paper I 
do not distinguish between early- and late-stage requirements [16], hard / functional and soft / non-functional 
requirements [15] or requirements and constraints [17]. 
2 Ontological and Epistemological Challenges
Suppose exactly two design objects D1 and D2 will achieve a goal g. Features of both design objects are requirements as 
there is no way to achieve g without them (Table 1). Properties of D1 but not D2 are not requirements as g may be 
achieved without them (building D2); properties of D2 but not D1 are not requirements as g may be achieved without 
them (building D1). Properties of neither object are irrelevant. More generally, suppose g may be achieved by n design 
objects (D1, D2, … Dn) each with features (F1, F2, … Fn). The set of requirements Rg may then be defined as the 
intersection of the properties (Rg = F1 ∩ F2 ∩ … ∩ Fn). 
Table 1. Relationship between properties and requirements
Property of D1 Not a Property of D1
Property of D2 requirement feature
Not Property of D2 feature irrelevant
Characterizing requirements as such reveals two assumptions. First, the existence of requirements entails overlap 
among design object features that may achieve a goal (Rg = F1 ∩ F2 ∩ … ∩ Fn ≠ ∅). In contrast, if the properties do not 
overlap (Rg = F1 ∩ F2 ∩ … ∩ Fn = ∅), there are no requirements (an ontological problem; Fig. 1). Second, stating 
requirements assumes that all relevant design objects (or classes thereof) have been identified. If another solution, 
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which will achieve g without any properties in common with known solutions, may exist, no properties of the existing 
solution sets are requirements (an epistemological problem). For example, suppose a company sets out to protect their 
network against malware, writing a requirements specification for a sophisticated antivirus system. During review, 
someone asks “Why don’t we just switch to Mac OS or Linux instead as they have fewer problems with viruses?”. This 
reveals ostensible ‘requirements’ as merely features of one solution.
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Figure 1. Relationship between features (dots) and requirements. 
Note: features common to all design alternatives are requirements (left); where no features overlap, no requirements 
exist (right).
In summary, if the solution space is unknowable or lacks overlap, no requirements can be stated. This is not the same as 
acknowledging ambiguous, conflicting or incomplete requirements. Either lack of overlap or epistemic uncertainty 
produce a no-requirements scenario.
3. Limitations and Proceeding without Requirements
The ontological and epistemological challenges to the requirements concept described above are obviously somewhat 
simplified. First, the discussion takes a counterfactual approach to causality [24] when a probabilistic approach would 
be more appropriate (features may increase success probability rather than being “necessary conditions”). Second, the 
definition of requirement excludes other non-critical desiderata (wants, preferences), which may still be important. 
Third, identifying a needed feature may not always necessitate understanding the full scope of the design space – a 
highly credible informant’s comment that ‘the board will never approve this if it won’t work on an iPhone’ may be 
sufficient to justify stating a requirement. 
However, the illustration illuminates two fundamental problems. First, we can conceive of situations (e.g., knowledge 
worker burnout) where two completely different approaches (e.g., better tool support or hire more employees) may 
achieve the same goal (e.g., decrease work hours) – in such cases of low solution overlap, few if any requirements can 
be stated. Second, without fully exploring the design space we cannot be sure whether there exists another approach, 
which would achieve the goal without any features of known approaches. 
This leaves the intellectual enterprise of RE research with two possibilities. One is that we should expect many software 
development projects to have few if any legitimate requirements, rendering many requirements engineering approaches 
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ineffective or inappropriate in these contexts. This raises fundamental questions concerning how to adapt existing RE 
approaches to no-requirements scenarios, or how to proceed without requirements more generally. 
Possibility two is that many existing RE approaches operationalize the requirements construct more generally – as 
desiderata, which may or may not be strictly necessary for success. This is problematic due to the strong denotation and 
connotation of the term. The word “requirement” denotes a thing that is compulsory. Listing requirements connotes 
certainty and unambiguousness. For example, when an analyst states that ‘cross-platform compatibility’ is a 
requirement, novice developers and stakeholders unfamiliar with the challenges of RE are unlikely to interpret this as 
‘the analyst hypothesizes that cross-platform compatibility will increase the probability that the system will achieve its 
objectives but we will not know for sure until the system is built, if ever’ or ‘all of the plausible design candidates 
generated so far include cross-platform compatibility, but we have not fully explored the design space’. A wide variety 
of cognitive phenomena including anchoring bias [25], fixation [26] and confirmation bias [27] suggest that 
misrepresenting an incidental feature as a requirement will reduce exploration of the design space, curtailing innovation 
[28]. 
The argument of this paper may be challenged on at least two grounds. First, one may draw a distinction between 
mandatory and optional requirements. In response I reiterate the psychological effect of mislabeling features as 
“requirements” (above), and suggest that the “optional requirement” label will likely increase confusion. Second, one 
may argue for conditional requirements, wherein some features become requirements conditional on other features, e.g., 
‘given that the design artifact is  a website, it must be HTML5-compliant’. However, this creates a reductionist spiral 
where virtually all design decisions may be recast as conditional requirements, undermining the distinction between 
requirements and design decisions and further confusing developers and curtailing innovation. 
In conclusion, this paper presents two novel challenges to RE. The ontological challenge posits that where many 
plausible approaches to achieving a goal are evident, there may be insufficient overlap between approaches to form 
requirements. The epistemological challenge posits that while all plausible approaches may have sufficient overlap to 
state requirements, one cannot know that unless all approaches are identified and one is somehow sure that none have 
been missed. I have formulated these challenges to stimulate debate on fundamental properties and assumptions of 
requirements in theory and practice. They raise important questions about possible requirement-sparse environments 
and the implications of goals, features, conjectures and design decisions mislabeled as requirements. 
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